
#### **TLS as an Operating System Service**

Daniel Zappala from Mark O'Neill's PhD Dissertation and USENIX Security papers

#### Part 1 TrustBase Simplified and Centralized Certificate Validation



# certificate validation problems


#### certificate authorities (CAs)

- generally can sign certificates for any host (Eckersley et al.)
- have been hacked, sometimes repeatedly (Marlinspike)
- can be influenced and operated by governments (Soghoian et al.)
- don't always follow best practices (see CNNIC)



#### for application developers

- mobile and desktop apps have validation problems
  - Brubaker et al., Georgiev et al., Onwuzurike et al., Fahl et al.
- security libraries are complicated
- security may not be a priority
- security may be a hassle



#### threat model



#### alternate and reinforcing strategies

- deal with many of these issues
- have no common platform or API
- have difficulty being adopted



#### trust decisions are outsourced


how do we enable admins to control the trust decisions of their own machines?

#### **TrustBase**

- motivating principles
  - centralize authentication as an OS service
  - empower system admins to dictate how trust decisions are made on their own machines
- design goals
  - secure all existing applications
  - prohibit unprivileged applications from acting against administrator rules
  - provide easy deployment of authentication systems
  - negligible overhead



#### moving trust to the OS







#### **Prototypes for**

- Linux
- Android (nonrooted)
- Windows

#### **TrustBase architecture**




#### **TrustBase architecture**




#### traffic interception (Linux)

- loadable kernel module
- hooks into native transport protocol functionality
- provides generic inspection/modification API




#### TrustBase architecture



#### **TLS handler**

- 1. monitor traffic for TLS records
- 2. record handshake messages
- 3. query policy engine with handshake data
- 4. receive policy response
  - 1. block connection if invalid
  - 2. allow if valid

#### TrustBase architecture




#### policy engine

- receives queries via Netlink
- implements basic CA validation
- aggregates decisions from plugins
  - necessary
  - voting
- provides native API
  - Linux capabilities



#### **TrustBase architecture**



#### plugins

- API allows synchronous and asynchronous plugins
  - openssl STACK\_OF(X509) or ASN.1 DER
- can report back yes/no/abstain/error for each chain
- have access to all handshake info (and more)



#### addons

- provide additional language support for plugins
- currently have native C and python addons
- API to add additional language support

#### example plugins and uses

- CA Validation (builtin)
- Certificate Pinning
- OSCP checking
- CRLSet blocking
- DANE
- Notary
- Cipher Suite Auditor

## evaluation

#### centralization and coverage

- bugs are global
- disruption is a DOS
- updates are global
- many eyeballs
- in line with other services


Library	Tool
C++	gnutls-cli
libcurl	curl
libgnutls	sslscan
libssl	openssl s_client
libnss	openssl s_time
JAVA	lynx
SSLSocketFactory	fetchmail
Perl	firefox
socket::ssl	chrome/chromium
PHP	mpop
fsockopen	w3m
php_curl	ncat
Python	wget
httplib	steam
httplib2	thunderbird
pycurl	kmail
pyOpenSSL	pidgin
python ssl	
urllib, urllib2, urllib3	
requests	

#### hardening




- unprivileged malware cannot unload interception
- CAP\_NET\_RAW is required to use raw sockets (default) and to bypass TrustBase interception
- CAP\_NET\_ADMIN required to receive and respond to queries
- configuration is writable only by privileged users
- daemons run nonroot with only required permissions

#### performance




#### performance



trustbase lets **you** trust **who** you want **how** you want

#### Part 2 Secure Socket API Simplified and Centralized TLS API



### your apps are vulnerable

#### **Application Errors**

We demonstrate that SSL certificate validation is completely broken in many security-critical applications and libraries. Vulnerable software includes <u>Amazon's EC2 Java library</u> and all cloud clients based on it; <u>Amazon's and PayPal's merchant SDKs</u> responsible for transmitting payment details from e-commerce sites to payment gateways; integrated shopping carts such as osCommerce, ZenCart, Ubercart, and PrestaShop; AdMob code used by mobile websites; <u>Chase mobile banking</u> and several other Android apps and libraries; Java Web-services middleware—including Apache Axis, Axis 2, Codehaus XFire, and Pusher library for Android—and all applications employing this middleware. Any SSL connection from any of these programs is insecure against a man-in-the-middle attack.

Georgiev, Martin, Subodh Iyengar, Suman Jana, Rishita Anubhai, Dan Boneh, and Vitaly Shmatikov. "The most dangerous code in the world: validating SSL certificates in non-browser software." In *Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security*, pp. 38-49. ACM, 2012.








## "The root cause of most of these vulnerabilities is the terrible design of the APIs to the underlying SSL libraries"

--The most dangerous code in the world: validating SSL certificates in non-browser software. Martin Georgiev et al., 2012. ACM CCS.

#### using TLS is hard

#### Symbols in libssl: 504

X509\_verify\_cert() SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify() SSL\_CTX\_set\_cert\_verify\_callback()



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	File Edit View Search Terminal Help				
<pre>Multiple manual provide a manual pr</pre>	<pre>Active - schematic restriction active - schematic restriction fine (URL + MOST NUMPER + STEE 235 efine (URL + STEE 23</pre>	<pre>{     const char *pattern label_end, *pattern_wildcard, *hostname_label_end;     int wildcard enabled;     int wildcard = strchr[pattern, '' ];     if(pattern wildcard = strchr[pattern, mildcard];</pre>	<pre>startude vopessider(); startude vopessider(); de vop</pre>	<pre>Server: gws X+XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block X-Farme-Options: SAMEONICM X-Farme-Options: SAMEONICM X-Farme-Options: SAMEONICM X-Farme-Options: SAMEONICM X-Farme-Options: SAMEONICM Set-Cookie: NID=124=9V28yfPGwdcjhhF6xf3SJDUg75b0s7MuBrdNKLOK18bLKZak3gm8iVlUppbsWdalR8gjscaPLc ZaeeXD AmdUnd(VFFKmhDMKD7851-0p2NMaGPWdigDzIayv0gVLsp7; expires=Fri, 31-Aug-2818 19:41:59 GMT; path-/; domain=.google.com; HttpDly Alt-Syc: hg=":441; mae:2992000; guic=513083431; guic=51308339; guic=51308338; guic=51308337; gu Ic=31308333; guic='443'; mae:2992000; guic=513083431; guic=51308339; guic=51308338; guic=51308337; gu Ic=3130833; guic='443'; mae:2992000; guid=513083431; guic=51308339; guic=51308338; guic=51308337; gu Ic=3130833; guic='443'; mae:2992000; guid=513083431; guic=51308339; guic=51308338; guic=51308337; gu Ic=3130833; guic='443'; mae:2992000; guid=513083431; guic=51308339; guic=51308338; guic=51308337; gu Ic=3120833; guic='443'; mae:2992000; guid=51308431; guic=51308339; guic=51308338; guic=51308337; gu Ic=3120833; guic='443'; mae:2992000; guid=51308431; guid=51308339; guid=51308337; gu Ic=3120833; guid='443'; mae:2992000; guid=51308431; guid=51308339; guid=51308337; gu Ic=312083; guid='440; guid=5120; guid=51</pre>	
<pre>strip (of (if, ex, quality of 1 are strip in (</pre>	<pre>on_mame_loc); if (common_mame_entry == MULE) { rotorn Error; } // Convert the CN field to n C string common_name_asn1 == XS99_NAWE_ENTRY_get_data(common_name_entry); if (common_name_asn1 == MULE) if (common_name_str = (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(common_name_asn1); // Mohe sore there isn't an embedded NUL character in the CN if (lsize_t)ASN1_STRING length(common_name_asn1) != strlen(common_name_str)) { rotorn HalformeVith the CN if (Compare expression Asstrance Vith the CN if (Cur_cert_hostcheck(common_name_str, hostname) == CURL_HOST_MATCH) { return MatchFound; } </pre>	<pre>suffixien = pattern_label_end - (pattern_vildcard+0); return Curl_raw_mequal(pattern, wildcard+0); Curl_raw_mequal(pattern, wildcard+1, host new label_end - suf- Curl_craw_mequal(pattern, wildcard+1, host new label_end - suf- Curl_cert_hostcheck(const char *match_pattern, const char *hostname) { int Curl_cert_hostcheck(const char *match_pattern    lbstname    !*hostname) /* sunity chack */ return =; if(Curl_raw_equal(hostname, match_pattern)) /* trivial coss */ return =; if(hostname,match_pattern) == CURL_HOST_MATCH) return =; }</pre>	<pre>sock = connect_to_bost(bALN , SOCK_STREAM(); tls = openssl_connect_tock, bostname);</pre>	<pre>server: gwk X+XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block X+XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block X-Frame-Options: SAMECHIGH X-Frame-Options: SAMECHIGH Set-Cookie: NID=124=afErjBejYBKB1A00f-KPkez-4HIrdgZIGV4rtLiAqQrbhhs2g3EXfg17LAFfUQHMA7LpfLi3-T WBSMMG3MdSjseZZELIKg9TI7LKZWAUJSckSVF57N7PGEr-bmnv0: expires=Fri, 31-Amg-2818 19:42:83 GWT; path=/; domain=_google.com; HttpOhly Alt-Svc: hg=":443"; ma=2592000; guic=51303431; guic=51303330; guic=51303338; guic=51303337; gu Accept-Ranges: none Yary: Accept-Emcoding Transfer-Encoding: chunked</pre>	
CURL_HOST_MOMATCH; CURL_HOST_MOMATCH; 'Returns Error if there was an error. 'Int connect_to_host(char* host, char* service, int protocol) { // int sock; // // // // // // // // // // // // //	<pre>while[+first 66 *second] {     if(Curraw_toupper(*first) != Curl_raw_toupper(*second))     fordu     first++;     second++;     second++;     second++;     if(Curl_raw_toupper(*first) == Curl_raw_toupper(*second));     atic int Curl_raw_nequal(cosst Char *first, cosst Char *second, size_t max) while[+first 66 *second 66 max) {         if(Curl_raw_toupper(*first) != Curl_raw_toupper(*second)) {             break;             fract++;             second++;             if(Curl_raw_toupper(*first) != Curl_raw_toupper(*second);             max;             ificurl_raw_toupper(*first) == Curl_raw_toupper(*second);             atic int hostmatch(cosst Char *hostmame, const char *patterm)             const char *patterm label_end, *pattern_wildcard, *hostmame_label_end;             if wildcard ==max[];             if wildcard ==max[];             if wildcard ==max[];             return vildcard == implt ==max[];             return is = dots in pattern to avoid too vide wildcard             match+;             vildcard ==secch[] strchr(pattern_label_end+?, ') == implt ==max[];             patterm_label_end == if() = strchr(pattern_label_end+?, ') == implt ==max[];             if(wildcard enabled) =:             if(wildcard enabled) :             if(wil</pre>	The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all capies or substantial portions of the Software. THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED " INTHOUT MARAANTIES OF THE INFORMATION TO THE MARAANTIES OF THE OFTEN THE	<pre>Depending add all algorithms(); EMP lead Editing(); EMP lead Copie strings(); SSL_lead_corput of the set of the s</pre>	<pre>if (cert == ddt) {     for inf([cdur, [Falled to get gear certif(cate\n");         exit[cdur FAllem];         if (validate bostname(hostname, cert) != MatchFound) {             frintf([, provide to residue control of certificate\n");         exit[cdur FAllem];         if (validate bostname(hostname, cert) != MatchFound) {             frintf([, provide to residue control of certificate\n");         exit[cdur FAllem];         if (validate bostname(hostname, cert) != MatchFound) {             frintf([, provide control of certificate\n");         exit[cdur FAllem];         }         return tls;         int consect_to host(char* bost, char* service, int protocol)          int sock;         int sock = for addr_ptr;         struct addrinf(be addr_ptr;         sock = socket(bdf, ptr sol, for ptr, we don't care         ret = getaddrinf(lett, service, for ptr, sodedrinf(s tock), gai_strerror(ret));         exit[cdur FALLem];         for (addr_ptr = addr_list; addr_ptr != Mall; addr_ptr = addr_ptr-sai_nemt) {             sock = socket(bdf_ptr-sai_family, addr_ptr-sai_socktype, addr_ptr-sai_protoce         );         if (connect(sock, addr_ptr-sai_addr, addr_ptr-sai_socktype, addr_ptr-sai_protoce         );         clase(sock);         coutinue;         j         freaddrinf(addr list);         if (addr_ptr = mil) {             perror( socket);             coutinue;         }         freaddrinf(addr list);         if (addr_ptr = mil) {             perror( socket);             coutinue;         }         freaddrinf(addr list);         if (addr_ptr = mil) {             perror( socket);             coutinue;         }         freaddrinf(addr list);         if (addr_ptr = mil) {             sock = socket(sock);</pre>	

#### can we do better?


#### can we use the POSIX socket API?

# can we use the POSIX socket API?


# can we use the POSIX socket API?

# the Secure Socket API (SSA)


## the Secure Socket API (SSA)



## **TLS via the POSIX socket API**



### **Userspace Encryption Daemon**



## **TLS API reduction**

#### OpenSSL

SSL\_CTX\_new

SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify

SSL\_new

SSL\_set\_fd

TLS\_method

SSL\_exts\_set\_hostname

SSL\_do\_handshake

SSL\_set\_verify\_callback

SSL\_get\_peer\_certificate

And 495 more...

Symbol Count

Secure Socket API
socket
bind
listen
connect
setsockopt
getsockopt
close
recv/recvfrom/recvmsg
send/sendto/sendmsg
getaddrinfo

```
int main() {
        struct sockaddr host addr;
        addr.sin family = AF HOSTNAME;
        strcpy(addr.sin_addr.name, "www.google.com");
        addr.sin port = htons(443);
        int sock fd = socket(PF INET, SOCK STREAM, IPPROTO TLS);
        connect(sock fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, sizeof(addr));
        char http_request[] = "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: www.google.com\r\n\r\n";
        char http response[2048];
        memset(http_response, 0, 2048);
        send(sock fd, http request, sizeof(http_request)-1, 0);
        recv(sock_fd, http_response, 2047, 0);
        close(sock fd);
        printf("Received:\n%s", http_response);
        return 0;
```

### reconnaissance

Features	Symbols
version selection	29
cipher suite selection	39
extension management	68
certificate/key management	73
certificate/key validation	51
session management	61
configuration	19
allocation	33
connection management	41
miscellaneous	64
instrumentation	26

analyzed 410 Ubuntu packages that depended on libssl

used developer behavior to guide our design developer options

setsockopt

getsockopt

### developer options

```
fd = socket (PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TLS);
/* Bind to local address and port */
bind (fd, &addr, sizeof(addr));
/* Assign certificate chain */
setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TLS, TLS_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN,
CERT_FILE, sizeof(CERT_FILE));
/* Assign private key */
setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TLS, TLS_PRIVATE_KEY,
KEY_FILE, sizeof(KEY_FILE));
```

• • •

### developer options

# setsockopt

### getsockopt

#### Option

TLS\_REMOTE\_HOSTNAME

TLS\_HOSTNAME

TLS\_TRUSTED\_PEER\_CERTIFICATES

TLS\_CERTIFICATE\_CHAIN

TLS\_PRIVATE\_KEY

TLS\_ALPN

TLS\_SESSION\_TTL

TLS\_DISABLE\_CIPHER

TLS\_PEER\_IDENTITY

TLS\_PEER\_CERTIFICATE\_CHAIN


## administrator options

- global configuration file assigns TLS defaults
- per-application profiles can further customize settings

Option	Description
TLS Version	Enabled TLS versions, in order of preference
Cipher Suites	Allowed cipher suites, in order of preference
Certificate Validation	Specified root store for certificate validation, or custom validation engine like TrustBase
Enabled Extensions	Specified TLS extensions to use (e.g., ALPN)
Session Caching	Specified session cache parameters
Default cert/key paths	Specify location of certificates and keys to use when application does not specify

## certificate validation


- admin's choice
  - standard validation
  - TrustBase
- TrustBase is an OS service that validates certificates according to admin config
- can enable multiple services (OSCP, CRLsets, custom root stores, Convergence, etc.)



## using the SSA


Application	LOC Modified	LOC Removed	Familiar with Code?	Time Taken		
Already using TLS						
wget	15	1,020	No	5 Hrs.		
lighttpd	8	2,063	No	5 Hrs.		
Not using TLS						
in-house webserver	5	0	Yes	5 Min.		
netcat	5	0	No	10 Min.		

## language support




- any language that uses the network uses network system calls (directly or indirectly)
- the SSA is implemented behind the system call layer
- adding SSA support to a language is trivial
  - Go: < 50 lines of code (syscall wrappers)
  - Python: new constants only
  - PHP: new constants only
  - C/C++: new constants only

## performance vs OpenSSL



Number of Processes

### broadening coverage



### dynamically ported ncat, wget, lighttpd, irssi

### outcomes

- general benefits
  - TLS through a known API
  - admin control of TLS settings
- implementation benefits
  - easy language support
  - natural privilege separation
  - alternative implementations supported



the Secure Socket API: enabling developers to **secure connections** using a **known API** in ways **you can control** 

### **Papers**

- Mark O'Neill, Scott Heidbrink, Scott Ruoti, Jordan Whitehead, Dan Bunker, Luke Dickinson, Travis Hendershot, Joshua Reynolds, Kent Seamons, and Daniel Zappala, <u>TrustBase: An Architecture to Repair and</u> <u>Strengthen Certificate-based Authentication</u>, USENIX Security, August 2017.
- Mark O'Neill, Scott Heidbrink, Jordan Whitehead, Tanner Perdue, Luke Dickinson, Torstein Collett, Nick Bonner, Kent Seamons, and Daniel Zappala, <u>The Secure Socket API: TLS as an Operating System Service</u>, USENIX Security, August 2018.

## **Source Code**

- source code: <u>https://github.com/markoneill/trustbase-linux</u>, <u>https://github.com/markoneill/trustbase-windows</u>
- kernel module: <u>https://github.com/markoneill/ssa</u>
- encryption daemon: <u>https://github.com/markoneill/ssa-daemon</u>
- pull requests welcome!
- project website: <u>https://owntrust.org</u>
- contact Mark: <u>mto@byu.edu</u>





thanks to our sponsors

## **Next Steps**

- Major tech transfer effort
- Libraries for various languages and OSes that will
  - check for kernel support and use that if available
  - check for an encryption daemon running and connect directly if available
  - worst case, do all the OpenSSL work needed for a secure connection
- Either way, developers use a simple POSIX API, and we try to use centralized policy/control where available

